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We show that recent big growth of applications of Category Theory to 
Physics might be associated with unavoidable appearance of model theoret­
ical structures coming from formal languages used to describe mathematical 
models of so called physical reality. Even in the simplest case of Elemen­
tary Protocolar Theory we are (to fulfil the conditions of consistency and 
simplicity of the language) confined to some model theoretical limitations.
We discuss some examples. We also formulate conjectures and perspectives 
for future investigations.
PACS numbers: 02.10.Ab, 03.65.Ca
1. D o e s  p h y s ic s  n e e d  a b s t r a c t  to o ls  o f  M o d e l T h e o ry  
o r  C a te g o ry  T h e o ry ?
One, quite obvious answer is: No. As any other abstract m athem atical 
tool, this might be avoided ju st by simple keeping track of experiments and 
their direct data. Let us try  to describe what it means th a t we have theory 
based on direct experimental data. First, we choose language as simple as 
possible (but consistent) whose individual variables refer to (finite) numbers 
of experiments. So, our sentences corresponding to  experiments are to be 
form ulated in the language of the so called first order predicate logic and 
consistency of the sentences is defined with respect to  this logic. The choice 
of first order logic is m otivated by minimal theoretical entanglement of this 
logic (see Section 2) and ability to  speak directly about set of experiments 
and its results. We have to  speak about some logic because of the consistency
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of theory we wish to  develop. Henkin had proven the completeness of the 
first order predicate logic by means of explicit construction of some models 
for theories in this language [34]. In particular it was proven:
T h e o re m  1 I f  T  is a consisten t theory in  the language o f fir s t order pred­
icate logic and i f  m  is a cardinality o f the set o f its prim itive  symbols, then  
T  is satisfied in  som e dom ain o f cardinality m.
In particular for m  =  R0 we have original Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem [32]. 
In fact it holds: [36]
T h e o re m  2 (L in d s tro m )  F irst order logic is the only one which is closed 
with respect to A, =, 3 and such tha t theorem s o f Com pactness and L ow eheim -  
Skolem  hold.
Next let us suppose we are performing n  experiments and as a result we have 
a set of values for set of observables to be measured in each of them . We want 
to  describe the language which would enable one to speak in consistent and 
direct way about this situation and which would be as simple as possible. 
Thus the set of symbols of the language should contain
set of symbols (variables) for measurements: m i, m 2, • • •
set of symbols (variables) for the results of measurements (numbers):
r y > m  r y g f f lXi , X2 • • •
set of symbols (variables) for the observables to  be measured: ob\, 
ob2, • • •
set of predicate symbols for expressing th a t in measurement m¿ we have 
measured an observable obj and we are obtaining x: x(obj ,  m ¿). . .
We require th a t the (intended) interpretation of the theory in such lan­
guage is the structure where domains
for nii  are measurements n¿, i =  1, 2, . . .  
for Xj  are numbers rj ,  j  =  1, 2, . . .
for obk are observables Obk, k  =  1, 2 , . . .  for any natural number of 
performed measurements.
The theory in the above language enables one to speak about performed 
measurements and to catalogue their results. This theory is to be called Ele­
m entary Protocolar Theory (EPT). Its intended models are simply measure­
ments — any finite number of them  along with their results, corresponding 
to  some finite number of observables. None of the finite number of experi­
ments is to  be expressed by the axioms of the theory so, this theory should 
have models in any finite cardinality. But being the first order it holds: [9]
T h e o re m  3 I f  theory T  in  the f ir s t order language has any arbitrarily large 
fin ite  model it has also in fin ite model.
So, our theory speaks as well about infinite number of measurements and 
about collecting their results. But in fact we have:
T h e o re m  4 A n y  E lem entary  Protocolar Theory has nonisom orphic no n ­
standard models.
Proof: this is ju st reformulation of Lowenheim-Skolem theorem  and observ­
ing th a t if M, N are two infinite models of the Theory of different cardinalities 
then M is not isomorphic to  N.
The peculiarity of this Theorem comes from our intention to  formulate 
E PT  which would be expressing uniquely the simple situation of cataloguing 
experimental da ta  (any finite) in a consistent way; this is not possible and 
in fact we are talking simultanouslv about any number of nonisomorphic 
domains where our theory is fulfilled. This is unavoidable.
We do not list up explicitly nonlogical axioms of the theory; we simply 
assume they do exist and they would enable us to  fulfil our minimal require­
ments — to talk  consistently about any finite number of experiments.
If such a theory does not exist it means we cannot talk  about any finite 
number of experiments in a direct (first order logic) and formally consistent 
way. This is even worse than  to have nonisomorphic models: the ability of 
constructing a formally consistent physical theory based on experiments is 
questionable.
Now let us suppose we are performing some number of experiments, say 
k  € N . In fc-th measurement we are getting a natural number k  as an 
output. We are formulating some sentence (predicate) in the first order 
language about natural numbers. It holds:
T h e o re m  5 Suppose, tha t we have countably in fin ite  num ber o f experim en­
tal outputs, which are interpreted by S tandard N atural Numbers. W ith each 
output we associate som e predicate related to natural numbers ( i f  only it is 
expressible in  the fir s t order predicate language, where each Standard Natural 
N um ber has a nam e). A lso, with each output we associate som e true fo r ­
mula o f Peano A rithm etic . E ven then, there is no consisten t Theory (in  the 
language o f the f ir s t  order logic), which would be generated by the above se­
quence, and which would allow one to describe what Standard N atural N u m ­
bers are.
Proof: the theory (N 0,S, + , •) of the structure of Standard N atural Numbers 
is not axiomatizable.
The explanation of this is due to  essential incompleteness of Peano A rith­
metic (PA) which is axiomatic, first order theory of natural numbers. In 
fact it holds: [11]
T h e o re m  6 PA has 2W° nonelem entary equivalent countable models.
This phenomenon is a direct consequence of Godel Incompleteness Theorem 
[37]. Prom the other side PA has unique Standard Model which is the 
structure (N 0,S, + , •) where N 0 is a set of all natural numbers with successor 
functional symbol S. The theory T h (N 0) of all true first order sentences in 
the standard  structure can be characterized: [8]
T h e o re m  7 The Theory T h (N 0) is hereditarily undecidable.
Notice, th a t hereditary undecidabilitv is stronger condition than  undecid- 
abilitv [8]. We also know that: [11]
T h e o re m  8 I f  Theory T  is consistent, complete and axiomatizable then T  
is decidable.
T h (N 0) is complete because all its true sentences are true in the model N 0 
(from definition); it is also consistent (it has a model N 0 ). Then we can 
conclude:
T h e o re m  9 T h (N 0)  is no t axiomatizable.
So, although we have Standard Model for PA which is unique we cannot 
use any recoursive set of sentences (in first order language) generating the 
theory T h (N 0). PA, being described formally by a recoursivelv axiom ati­
zable means, allows infinitely (continuous) many nonisomorphic countable 
models. In fact we have proved:
T h e o re m  10 One cannot give an infinite, in  fact, recoursively enumerable 
list o f sentences in  the language o f the f ir s t order predicate logic describ­
ing experim ental outputs which would be expressing the theory o f all natural 
numbers which order tha t list.
The order and recoursive character of infinite experimental da ta  cannot be 
explained by the theory generated bv protocolar sentences associated to the 
data, even in the case when every successive experiment is producing suc­
cessive natural number. Even infinite sequence of experimental protocolar 
sentences plus PA are not able to  cover formally all true sentences in the 
structure (M 0, S, + , •), where M 0 are natural numbers indexing experiments 
under consideration.
T h e o re m  11 We are perform ing in fin ite  countably m any experim ents gen­
erating predicates ( P ^ S n ) } ^  about natural numbers. We cannot generate 
the theory o f standard natural numbers (even fo r  every n we have x n =  n ).
This theorem  announces an im portant thing: we cannot trea t experimental 
da ta  literally. Sentences {P g}(n)  expressing th a t n  is ju st n, for every n, 
do not express th a t we are in fact dealing with unique domain of standard 
natural numbers. So, literal and consistent treating of experimental da ta  
is not fully legitimate. This is also a hint toward necessity to use Model 
Theoretic analysis, a t least in some cases when we are to  formulate formal 
theories with intention to be very tightly connected to  experiments.
Even if we are treating every measurement and every result correspond­
ing to  it (expressed by predicates) as axioms we are formally talking about 
noncountablv many nonequivalent domains and there is no way to  improve 
it by performing more experiments and adjoining more protocolar sentences 
as axioms (in fact any first order) into the language of the theory.
We can, of course, avoid this strange behaviour ju st by considering only 
a finite number of formal sentences, say k, corresponding to finite number 
of experiments bu t again we can try  to  built the formal, consistent theory 
(in first order language), which would be about those protocolar sentences 
(about any finite number of them ), having arbitrarily large finite intended 
models; the reason is the statem ent: ‘We have exactly fc-finite events’ is not 
a logical axiom and is not nonlogical as well (we do not form ulate the theory 
ju st about k  events and not about k  +  1, there is no logical reason for that).
Also, assuming th a t we already know well what the set of all natural 
numbers is (or any other m athem atical object is) not caring about their not 
unique formal description as a first order theory, we are obtaining the so 
called manv-sorted logic [36]. This logic can be equivalently form ulated as a 
first order [36] and Lowenheim-Skolem theorem also holds for it (althought 
compactness theorem does not hold).
If it is about Set Theory it can have axiomatic form, so called Zermelo- 
Fraenkel Set Theory (ZF) possibly with addition of the axiom of choice 
(ZFC). ZFC is the theory in the first order language without any functional 
or constant symbols; the only predicate symbol is binary G-svmbol, express­
ing property of being an element [10]. As usual we have countablv many 
individual variable symbols. As the first order theory (possibly consistent) 
it posseses also a countable model (from Lowenheim-Skolem theorem). This 
is a little bit strange but let us notice th a t this model can be standard  in the 
sense of accordance of its internal E-svmbol (expressing being an element) 
to  external, usual G-svmbol [38]. Moreover, this model can be standard 
with respect to equality which can be the same as external one (normal 
model). Then we see th a t for ZFC there does not even exist a unique Stan­
dard Model and the variety of its standard  and nonstandard models is realv 
huge [10,33]. ZFC does not respect our intention to speak uniquellv about 
some standard  universe of sets. Moreover, we can define N atural Numbers 
in ZFC (e.g. [46]). If one tries to regard ZFC as a basic theory this would 
lead to relativisation phenomena even for finite natural numbers.
We have seen th a t in some sense first order theory of S tandard N atu­
ral Numbers is not experimental — it cannot be generated by a countable 
number of first order axioms coming from the experiments.
Turning to the higher order theory one becomes immediately equipped 
with some additional theoretical tool. The second order theory is the one 
based on the language allowing, roughly speaking, for quantifications over 
subsets of some set M  and over functions F  : M  x M  —» M .  The first order 
theory allows for quantifications only over elements of set M .
Some notions which are not unique in first order theory in higher order 
theories sometimes become unique (up to isomorphism). A good example 
is the ordered field of real numbers i.e. the structure R  =  (R , + ,
We have: [36]
T h e o re m  12 There does no t exist a set o f axiom s in  the fir s t  order logic 
which would characterize R  uniquelly up to isom orphism .
Proof: it is direct consequence of Lowenheim-Skolem theorem and observa­
tion th a t language of the first order logic is countable and the number of 
first order formulas true in R  is countable. Then there exists a countable 
model; this model is not isomorphic to  R .
But it is known th a t second order logic characterizes R  uniquely up to 
isomorphism [36].
The axiom which cannot be formulated in first order logic is the com­
pleteness axiom:
\ /X  C R (if->(X =  0) is bounded, then X  has least upper bound)
This axiom is dealing with universum of Set Theory by taking use of power 
set operation. This phenomenon is characteristic for higher order theories — 
we have to rely on the set theory which in tu rn  has very nontrivial spectrum  
of its models. So, we can sometimes avoid nonuniqueness of description 
of some m athem atical structures (in first order language) by appealling to 
higher order language but a t the expense of dealing with nonunique models 
coming from set theory. (By the second Godel Incompleteness Theorem [37] 
the statem ent ‘ZFC has a m odel’ cannot be proved by formal means in ZFC 
itself, bu t if there does not exist any model of ZFC at all, ZFC would be 
inconsistent [10].) For higher order logics we have also many nonisomor­
phic nonstandard models which were originally constructed by Henkin [35]. 
He also showed th a t the higher order logic is not complete without taking 
into account these nonstandard models. Higher order logic is complete only 
with respect to  its nonstandard models. Hence, we see th a t we are expressing
some uniqueness of m athem atical structures in higher order theories by use 
of the language which is not complete by itself with respect to  standard 
structures [45].
There exists so called Hilbert thesis [36] which states th a t it should be 
possible to  translate all m athem atical statem ents (nonlogical) into first order 
language and proofs (provability relations), even nonformal, which exist in 
m athem atics, would become formal in the sense of first order logic.
This is also plausible th a t most of the formal, based on m athem atics, 
reasonings in physics could be (in principle) expressed in first order logic. 
Every day language used in physics does not care about its order and it 
is rather arbitrary  m ixture of orders and self referential expressions. But 
this does not change the fact th a t in the end physics tries to  refer to  formal 
reasonings which are dependent on distinguishing orders and as a result to 
situations sensitive for theory of models.
3. W h y  d o  p h y s ic is ts  in  p ra c t ic e  av o id  m o d e l th e o r e t ic  re a so n in g ?
We list here some reasons answering the question in the title.
1. Construction of models for the first order theory (and not only [49]) 
might be performed by the use of closed well formed formulas (cwflj 
of the language of the theory; there is an infinite number of them . But 
in practice we are conducting physical analysis in finitistic way, using 
only finite number of sentences from the every day language. Even 
formal languages are considered finitisticallv. From the other side we 
freely analyse infinite numbers of various formal objects like quantum  
states, dimensions of Hilbert space, particles, degrees of freedom etc. 
So, the finiteness is only with respect to formal languages used.
2. We do not analyze the situation of having infinite number of formulas 
or sentences which are expressing something in nonintended way, which 
seems to be unavoidable because of the formal language used.
3. We do not explore the structure of the sentences; they apperentlv 
look like being transparent. Because of this the logic also seems to  be 
transparent.
4. We trea t m athem atics as a closed, ready to use, given for granted 
system of procedures which can or cannot be used for specific applica­
tions.
5. The above facts always allow one to  be in a distinguished position; 
from one side we are outside of the internal problems and techniques 
specific to m athem atics. We use only procedures generated somewhere
outside and we have direct access to them  by using transparent lan­
guage. From the other side we have always direct access to  experiments 
and their results which is possible also because of the transparency and 
directness of the language.
6. Because of the assumed transparency of the language (formal) what 
we freely use is not a formal language but the one which mixes orders, 
logics and is selfreferential.
7. Also because of the transparency of the language we trea t objects and 
its names as equally managable.
Those conditions are incidentally characteristic also for classical descrip­
tions of the physical world. The classical language seems to  be nonappro- 
priate to  describe some Q uantum  Mechanical phenomena. T ha t is why, the 
main field where Model Theory would find applications is Q uantum  Me­
chanics.
4. S om e a rg u m e n ts  fo r u s in g  to o ls  o f  M o d e l T h e o ry  in  p h y s ic s
Although we have given some evidence for nonuniqueness of formal de­
scriptions of some simple situations dealing with making experiments and 
cataloguing their results, we still do not see the necessity of using tools of 
Model Theory in physics. Here we collect argum ents for the existence of 
appropriate place for them  in physics.
First: physics is not free of difficulties; some of them  are very basic (e.g. 
Q uantum  Gravity and its background independent formulation (48]).
Second: the argum ents coming from Model Theory are purely m athe­
m atical in fact, and, in principle, could be used in physics (and in fact they 
are (see Section 5]).
Third: every day physical practice is to  built various m athem atical mod­
els of the so called reality. Language is also a part of the reality (with its 
well established formal shape). W hy we do not need at all the models of the 
language in a correct m athem atical modelling of the reality?
From the discussion of the previous paragraphs we can form ulate the 
general rule of transparency of the language:
G e n e ra l  R u le  0 We are talking directly about, the results o f experim ents 
and we are building direct m athem atical models o f the reality. Precision o f 
the m easurem ent is the only obstruction fo r  models to be perfect.
We clearly see th a t the above rule is not valid in QM. There are inherent 
reasons for measurements not to  be precise, it does not m atter how precise 
measuring devices are. It might be th a t this is connected with the opposite
rule of nontransparency of the language and this would show exactly the 
place where Model Theory might be applied? We can form ulate the possible 
rule as follows:
G e n e ra l  R u le  1 Form al languages (and also physical reasoning based on 
them ) are talking directly about their models, no t about reality, usually are 
no t uniquely determ ined. E xperim ents and their results are given to us by 
nonavoidable protocolar fo rm a l language. This language is associated to them  
as a fo rm a l language to its models.
Let us observe th a t the language of QM is not usually directly connected 
to  the so called reality: we are talking about quantum  states, or amplitudes 
for example which are not observable in principle. They have only the­
oretical meaning as a nondispensable part of the structure of the theory. 
Observables, even commuting lose their meaning as having assigned values 
before experiment (see Kochen-Specker theorem  in Section 5). One can­
not m easure non commuting observables simultaneously with the arbitrarily  
high precision. All this is not ju st failure of our description and /o r lack of 
precision of the measurements bu t they are very features of reality — as if 
formal language would become the part of it. One proposition for realiza­
tion of these ideas in context of QM can be found in Section 5. It is also 
well known th a t logic generated by QM is not classical [51]. The so called 
Q uantum  Logics are intensively explored, and also from this perspective [7] 
the connection between QM and Category Theory is evident.
Anoher clue for using tools of model theory comes from existence of 
highly theoretical (speculative) branches of physics. There are: Superstring 
theory (so called M -theorv and related A dS /C FT  correspondece, the princi­
ple of Holography), Q uantum  Gravity approaches (background independent 
theories [loop QG and categorification], causal sets) or even Cosmology.
Formal m athem atical models require formal languages which are subjects 
to  Model Theory. Those branches of physics are not so tightly connected 
with experiments and formal aspects like internal consistency of the theory 
plays a big role here.This is the reason why modelling of the formal language 
might be also a valuable tool (see e.g. [43,44]). Let us notice an im portant 
feature of a model theoretical approach: the formal language becomes an 
object which in tu rn  is investigated. From m athem atical point of view we 
know th a t the object in question is special category which is called topos 
[49]. T ha t is why the appearances of topos structure in physical theories (in 
essential way) give a strong hint toward ability of model theoretical analysis. 
Also, our dealing with various non trivial (which are not Set) Categories, in 
the context of physical considerations justifies Model Theoretical approach. 
Category Theory [7] is a correct language to  talk  about toposes which in 
tu rn  allows model theory considerations [49].
We shall return  to this point in Section 6 . In the next section we give 
physical examples where Model Theory and Categories are essentially in­
volved.
5. E xam p les
5.1. QM and toposes
It has recently been proposed [1,2] how the structure of the toposes arises 
in QM. It was achieved by restating the so called Kochen-Specker theorem 
in QM [3] in term s of nonexistence of global elements in a special topos 
S e tw  (of sheaves of dual Boole’an subalgebras of the lattice of projection 
operators in Hilbert space H, d im (H )> 2).
T h eorem  13 (K och en -S p eck er  1965, 1967) Let © be a family of ob­
servables (self adjoint, linear operators) over Hilbert space H, dim(H)> 2 
such that identity Id  G 0  and let us consider functions (partial homomor- 
phisms):
h : © —> R  such that
whenever A, B  G © and [A, B] =  0 and
h (A B )  = h (A )h (B ), h(XA  +  p B )  =  Ah(A)  +  ph( B) ,  h(Id)  =  1 
then there does not exist global hom,om,orphism, 
h : 0 ^ R
compatible with partial ones.
Hence, no global assignment of real values to  observables is possible in 
d im (H )> 2. The Isham construction shows th a t nonexistence of compatible 
extension for partial valuations over all observables from © is expressible 
exactly as, so called functional condition for nonexistence of global element 
in the topos S e tw  :
7|Wi(0) =  l \ w 2{0) ,
where 7  is a global element and 6 is any operator from © and from the 
common part of W \  and W2 as any subalgebras of 0 .  This result is a di­
rect indication for a deep relation between toposes — which are models of 
higher order (intuitionistic) logic — and QM. Also in the context of Quan­
tum  Gravity, Isham and Butterfield [1] have pointed out connections with 
toposes.
5.2. Models of ZFC and QM
We propose here a direct application of m ethods of Model Theory to 
QM which could be, at least, applied to interpretational investigations of 
QM. The work is in progress. Let us withhold the statem ent th a t Zermelo- 
Fraenkel axiomatic Set Theory with the Axiom of Choice- ZFC -speaks di­
rectly about “reality”. It tells the tru th s  about its models. Let us suppose 
th a t ZFC is consistent, so, some model of ZFC does exist. We know from 
Lôwenheim-Skolem theorem and from collapsing Mostowski’s lemma [10] 
th a t there exists Countable Transitive Model (standard) (CTM) — M.
The sentence <p: “M is countable” is not provable in M (if it were it would 
cause th a t every set in M was countable, bu t 2H° is not countable in ZFC 
and also in M). It means th a t the function f: N  — M ( ‘l  to  1’) is not a set 
in M. Of course, from the outside any {x  G M |\F} is countable as being a 
subset of N .
We claim th a t discreteness of measured spectra of some physical observ­
ables might be connected to  countability of Models of ZFC where also reals 
R  are countable from the ‘outside’ (with respect to  m etatheorv). Notice, 
th a t all sentences expressing any first order property of ZFC are valid as well 
in any countable model M. The set of all real numbers in M is also count­
able from the outside. So, measuring any real valued quantity  in M gives us 
countable spectra. This observation is basic in trials to explain Q uantum  
Mechanical phenomena via Model Theory. This is in to ta l agreement with 
our General Rule 1 from Section 4.
In a direct way we can (by the use of formal theory) speak about mod­
els of the theory (not about the so called reality); th a t is why there are 
situations where our statem ents about what we actually measure are ‘fil­
tered ’ through the models of the theory. In the case of ZFC where almost 
all classical m athem atics can be expressed [36] we have a very fundam en­
tal phenomenon comparable to  generating Everettian worlds. Any output 
of the measurement is prim arily connected (if it is about its set theoretical 
properties) to some model of ZFC (not necessarily to  S tandard one which is 
not formally distinguished but only intended).
To be more precise we need the m ethod of so called forcing which was 
originally invented by Cohen [38] as a way to  prove independence of Axiom 
of Choice and Continuum Hypothesis from the axioms of ZF.
From our perspective forcing is a passage from one model M of ZF(C) 
to  another model N ju st by adding some set (or sets) not originally included 
in M. Such a set is called generic. If the Generic Set is ju st a subset of the 
set of natural numbers we call it generic real and this is what Cohen forcing 
adds to M (we call it also Cohen real). For countable models of ZF(C) the 
generic set Q always exists [10]. The procedure of forcing is a beautiful and 
nontrivial subject in itself and since 1963 it has been developed in various 
directions:
A. Boole’an Valued Models [29]
B. Model theoretic Forcing (finite and infinite) (Robinson in seventies [36]).
C. Categorical (topos theoretic Forcing) [30].
D. Forcing in so called Descriptive Set Theory [47].
In the context of our approach to  QM we form ulate the following rule 
showing the role of forcing;
G e n e ra l  R u le  2 E very ou tput o f the experim ent (which is a real num ber) 
is given by a forcing which adds this real (reals) in to  som e model (models) 
o f Z F ( C ) .
This supposition does not mean we have a good knowledge of Models 
of ZF(C) under consideration. By the above supposition we can trea t real 
numbers as being bounded by the forcing procedure, so, they are model 
dependent rather then reals which stay the same no m atter what is the 
context in which they appear. All this requires more detailed analysis. The 
work on this approach is carried out by the author.
5.3. N on-S tandard  A nalysis and Physics
Deep connections of QM and Model Theory were exhibited in the con­
tex t of the so called N on-Standard Analysis (NA) [40]. NA was created and 
developed by Abraham  Robinson in sixties [18]. Robinson had made a huge 
contribution to  many branches of Model Theory [36]. NA is a direct appli­
cation of nonstandard models (in the sense of first order predicate logic) of 
the theory of real numbers into m athem atical analysis. This enables one, for 
the first time, to  speak consistently about infinitely big and small quantities. 
The work of Farrukh shows usefulness and naturalitv  of nonstandard notions 
(for example Nonstandard Hilbert Space) in the context of QM and its use 
of so called rigged Hilbert spaces and notorious use of ¿-functions in QM. 
Much work on NA and QM was also done by Kobavashi [15,16]. He had 
approached the problem of measurement by means of model theoretical con­
structions. Robinson also wrote some papers on physics and NA [17]. NA is 
about reals, so it obviously can be formally adopted into many branches of 
physics and m athem atics, bu t usually (in the context of physics or analysis) 
it gives equivalent description and sometimes simplifies formal proofs [18]. 
The appearance of NA and its applications to  physics are big clue toward 
correctness of the use of Model Theoretic m ethods in physics.
5.4- G R and toposes
There exists categorical approach to  the analysis of infinitesimals so 
called Synthetic Differential Geom etry [5]. The work of Moerdijk and Reyes
[6] deals with models of infinitesimal analysis in toposes which are naturally  
generated in this context. The attem pts to  apply these ideas to  physics were 
m ade in several papers [12-14]. They have tried to place General Relativity 
in the context of intuitionistic logic showing th a t the language of Synthetic 
Differential Geometry and toposes enables us to  see various space-time solu­
tions of the E instein’s Equations as ju st single varying object (in the sense 
of Lawvere [27]). Isham [1] also suggests the usefulness of Synthetic Differ­
ential Geometry in some approach to  QG — so called Consistent Histories 
formulation.
5.5. The program o f categorifixation
Explicitly, the program  of categorification has been proposed by Baez 
[28]. In the eighties Abbhav Ashtekar [50] have introduced his new coordi­
nates into GR. Since then it was possible to develop background independent 
nonperturbative quantum  theory of gravity via so called loop QG [48]. This 
theory for the first tim e was able to produce explicitly solutions of quantum  
W heeler-de W itt equations. W itten  then conjectured [28] close connection 
of this solution to  Jones invariant of links.
Many authors have produced invariants of 3-dim and 4-dim compact 
manifolds [21-23,25]. It was along growing evidence for necessity to  use 
abstract categories in this context (for example Hopf or Braided Monoidal 
categories). These invariants are widely used in connection with modelling 
of quantities (as transition amplitudes) of QG: from the one side we have 
triangulations of manifolds and colouring technique associating to  it repre­
sentations of groups and vertex operators resulting in calculations of invari­
ants as traces in the so called tensor categories, bu t from the other side the 
invariant is a real topological invariant (it does not depend on triangula­
tion used). For some reasons representations of groups should be replaced 
by Categories (Category of Representations of Hopf algebra) entering the 
higher order categories [23].
Verv accurate language for considering QG in this context is the one 
coming from the so called Topological Q uantum  Field Theories where general 
cobordisms of the manifolds correspond to  sta te  transitions in QG. It was 
firstly formulated in axiomatic way by Ativah in 1988 and developed in [28].
Categorification as an indispensable technique in QG was conjectured 
from the verv beginning and then developed in a verv promising direction 
by Crane [19,20].
The necessity to use categories in this kind of considerations relies also 
on the peculiar fact (which is deeply Model Theoretic) that some consistent 
theories do not possess models in Set Category [42].
6. C onclusions and perspectives
6.1. First order categorical logic
The idea that language can be a kind of object which should be equally 
taken under consideration as any other object is not new but in the con­
text of formal languages was realized not very long ago. It was originally 
done by Lawvere [26] who introduced categorical formulation of algebraic 
theories. Incidently Lawvere was one of the creators of topos theory and 
its wide applications [27]. To treat the language as any other object, seems 
to be strange (openness of the every day language) but on formal level this 
is crucial — we do not have simply mathematical structures described in a 
transparent language; the structure is effected by the language used. Clearly 
the equivalence of the so called coherent theory T (which is somewhat re­
stricted version of the first order theory) with special category ¿?t (built of 
some formulas of the theory T) was done in [31]. So, to speak about models 
of T in a category (topos) Q we can equivalently speak about some functors 
M: ¿?t —> Q- Such a picture enables one to replace logic by categories. Also 
for special first order theories we can associate naturally toposes which are 
‘to classify’ theories (Classifying toposes); they fully recognise the category 
of models (in toposes) of the theory. This approach enables one to develop 
investigation of models of theories and theories itself as the same kind of 
objects in unified way [4].
6.2. Higher order categorical logic
We have seen close connections of some physical theories with toposes 
which are special categories. From the perspective of the Model Theory, 
the toposes arose as natural objects whose internal language is the higher 
order intuitionistic one [49]. Henkin [35] proved completeness of higher order 
logic with respect to so called Nonstandard Models (the theory has enough 
nonstandard models to ensure that its theorems are semantically valid). 
Later it was realized that correct description of this phenomenon is just by 
models in toposes; moreover any (higher order) language generates topos 
T (L) whose internal language L (T(L))  naturally interprets the language 
L  [49]. So, the objectivisation of the languages (first or higher order) by 
means of Model Theory gives us toposes as objects to be considered in this 
context. That is why toposes which arose in the context of physical theories
are hints for deep internal entanglement of Model Theory tools with some 
physical theories.
There is a big difference between intended domain which we want the 
formal theory to describe and true domain it deals with and at least in some 
cases it has to be taken into account also by physicists. Especially it could 
be done (in principle) in the context of:
•  Anti-deSitter — Conformal Field Theory correspondence,
• M-theorv, Dualities in Superstrings, Holography,
• Interpretations of QM,
.  QG.
Detailed studies of the cases are in preparation. We can conclude by saying 
that some analysis in physics that neglect Model Theory perspectives are at 
best approximate.
The author would like to thank W. Derechowski for much help and dis­
cussion, Z. Krol for discussion and bibliographical help and to J. Sladkowski 
for creating the opportunity to present this paper and his help during the 
preparation. Special thanks go to M. Biesiada.
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